particularly evident during the 1994 municipal elections where it won the mayors office in twenty-eight cities induding Istanbul and Ankara. The party became further -albeit temporarily-embedded on Turkeys political map when, during the December 1995 general elections, it captured a respectable twenty-one percent of the popular vote. A percentage which, for the first time in its history, made it the largest party in parliament and allowed it to put together a ruling coalition govemment in June 1996 after the previous govemment coalition was brought down on cornıption charges. 3 Turkey has its own unique complexities, and any attempt to com e up with an overarching general explanation will inevitably lead to oversimplification.
Describing Turkish politics as a battleground between secularism and fundamentalism and focusing on the looming threat of political Islam make good headlines, but a poor baç;is for analysis. Prior to the 1995 general elections for example, Tansu Çiller, the the n Prime Minister and leader of the True Path Party, daimed that should the Refah Party win the forthcoming elections, Turkey was destined to became another Iran. This prospect, as the Prime Minister put it, would result in the fall of Turkeyand 'if Turkey falls', she wamed, Islamic 'fundamentalism will reach Europe'.4
Again, it was on the basis of similar perceptions that in June 1997, the military decided to oust the Islamic party from office. Indicative of this was the comments of Turkey's chief of military intelligence, General Fevzi Türkeri. The General, it seems, appeared to justify the military's position with regard to the Refah Party by daiming that the country was 'facing an extremely serious it was with the return of multi-party politics in 1983, that the party reemerged under the new name of Refah. See B. Toprak, 'CiviI Society in Turkey', in A. G. Norton (cd.) News and World Report, Vol. 116, No. 22, 6 June 1994. threat' because the Islamic movement was 'working c10sely with Iran ...to pull Turkey into an endless darkness'.5 The point here, and as the se statements illustrate, is the assumption by Turkey's secular elite that an apparenlly mainstream Islamic party successfully participating within the formal political arena would most likely result in the transformation of the country along lines similar to that of post-revolutionary Iran. The focus of this paper is to question the viability of this logic. That is, to assess the degree to which the prevalence of political Islam in contemporary Turkey realistically renders its fate comparable to that of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Turkeyand
Iran: Historical patterns in the relationship of Din wa Dawla (Religion and the State)
On su rface , it would appear that both Turkeyand Iran have shared characteristics, which might indeed encourage comparison. Apart from being the only non-Arab Muslim states in the Middle East, it can be argued that in the case of both nations, disparate external constraints were significant factors influencing the formation of the two republics. In both eascs for example geopolitical eonstraints:
... arising from the regional conteııt (the insidious connict between Greece and Turkey; the Iran-Iraq war), the long East-West canfrontation, in which Central Asia was one of the major frontiers ... the collapse of the Soviet Union and the war in Kuwail. ...nurtured a spccific republican imaginary ... Above all, they opened the door to the interventian of outside actors who had no hesitation in influencing the trajectory of these republics by means of war, the secret services, terrorism or aid. 6
Moreover the manner in which disparate external eonstraints played a role in the shaping of both rcpublies:
... seems less importa nt than that of internal dynamics. This is obvious in the case of Iran, where the selling up of the Islarnic Republic was a double rejection of ellternal conSlraints: American influence, and 5Quoted The fact that internal dynamics led to the disparate path s of a nationalist struggle in the case of Turkeyand later, an Islamic Revolution in the case of Iran, is in itself an indication of the distinctiveness of both nations. On this basis, if one turns to the early part of the twentieth century, it is perhaps not too surprising therefore to find that even though Turkeyand Iran both experienced modernizing authoritarian regimes, the se regimes differed extensively on ce one passed 'the outward appearance of certain reforms undertaken by Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah '. 8 Indeed it can be noted that Reza Shah's modernisation drive included efforts at industriali sation, expansion of the educational system, the upgrading and expanding the transportation system (including the construction of Irans fırst railway system, TransIranian Railway), the establishmçnt of a National Bank and the transformation of the bureaucracy from a haphazard collection of hereditary scribes -some without fixed offices-into ten fullfledged ministries employing over 90,000 eivil servants. 9 it can also be noted that under Reza Shah, the creation of Iran's fırst modern army allowed central government 'for the fırst time in living history ... the military means to impose its will on the provinces'.10 Moreover, the drive for secularisation meant amongst other things, the Ministry of Justice substituting traditional clerical courts with a modern judieial system based on European jurisprudence. 11
In this respect, the modernising reforms of Reza Shah did not on surface, differ significantly from the re form s adopted by Atatürk in his attempt to modernise Turkey. Yet whereas Reza Shah's modernisation reforms strengthened the state in terms of providing it with new instruments of coereion and administration, the state nevertheless rcmained weak since it failed to link its new institutions to the social structure of the country. In holy law, was therefore abolished; education in public schools was to be strictly secular and focused on pre-Islamic (pre-üttoman) Turkish past'.20
Atatürk's modernisation efforts and the lack of organised opposition from religious groups was largely linked to his ability to preserve the intertwined relationship of Din wa Dawla (religion and the state) inherited from the üttomans. In other words, Atatürk 'definitively subordinated the one to the other by the way of the üffice of Religious Affairso..In this way he took up the old scheme of the sultans, always anxious to make the ulama subject to them' .21 The overall difference bctween Islam under the üttomans and Qajar Iran in this respect is that, as Zubaida points out:
The specific character of modem Iranian Shiism is not to be sought in some inherent essence of Shiism in general. but in the recent history of Iranian society and state. Hence, whereas Atatürk inherited and was able to maintain from the üttomans a process whereby Din wa Dawla were not separate but intertwined entities in which the state maintained domination, Reza Shah inherited from the Qajars a situation whereby religious 'magnates fonned part of the local power structures [and] Mujtahids (clerics of high rank) were often wealthy landlords in their own right, as well as controlling rcvenues from religious endowments (waqfs) '.23 Indeed, the influence of the clergy and the religious classes as a whole in early twentieth century Iran can be detected in the fact that the fall of the Qajar dynasty and the subsequent rise of Reza Khan and his Pahlavi dynasty was to some degree linked to their support. As Baktiari points out: 'Reza Khan seemed to have been following the events in Turkeyo .. His aim was to find some 3. Contrasting Nat~re of Political Islam lt is well documented that the influence of an autonomous and cohesive religious class in Iran and its significance in Iranian politics were to eventually play a crucial role in the downfall of the Pahlavi dynasty.25 Nevertheless, it is worth noting here that the formation of an Islamic republic and the role of the clergy in its eventual establishment in Iran appears to have been enhanced as a consequence of growing opposition to modemisation programmes in general and secular policies in particular. The clergy, in other words, began to move under the rule of Mohammed Reza Shah, from a 'quietist phase' in the 1950s to 'rebellious t and later 'revolutionary' phases in the 1960s and 1970s bccause:
... seeularism in general, and the erosion of the Islamie eontent of familyand personal as well as property law s in partieular, remained focal points of resistance. In the eontent of diseourse seeularism was defined as the paramount expression of dependent eapitalism and imperialist penetration into the eountry ... Seeularism was associated with ever-inereasing state control and the failures of the state were explained in terms of the failure of modemist anti-religious policies. 26
The fact that the Iranian clergy were in a pasition to express their discontents and move through these phases is not simply indicative of their autonomy as a religious group from the state, has benefited for inore than 20 years from the disereet support and eomplieity of a number of ostensibly seeular forees'.28 Indicative of this is that: 'In the early days, the party was eourted by rightist formations anxious to please their conservative and Islamie electorate [and as a eonsequence] Necmettin Erbakan, the head of Refah, represented the Islamie movements as deputy prime minister in three government coalitions in the 1970s'.29 What this indicates therefore is that whereas the popular support, and ultimately politieal power, gained by the Iranian elergy was linked to their distance from the then prevailing politieal system, Refah's rise to prominenee was invariably linked to its integration within Turkey's existing politieal strueture.
lt is also worth noting that in pre-revolutionary Iran, the clergy attracted adherents representing diyerse elements within the Iranian social order on the basis that all were united in their 'profound sense of moral outrage at the aneient regime, blaming it for squandering the country's wealth and for favouring the rich over the poor'.30 Refah's bone of eontention, on the other hand, did not appear to have been aimed direetly at the Turkish politieal system but rather, at certain ideological aspects such as the coneept of nationalism and interpretations of modernity. of believers) makes no distinction between its children, whatever their ethnic or linguistic background'. 31 Moreover, according to the party's 'Just Order',32 modemity in terms of Atatürk's legacy of Westem imitation proved beneficial only to the West. The argument, similar to classical dependency theory, bcing that it allowed the West to develop 'by under-developing the Islamic world in general and Turkey in particular'. However, whilst it goes on to declare that there is no 'enmity towards the West', it is, according to one party official, 'both logical and reasonable' that 'the same as the West unites to serve its interests, the Islamic nation should unite for its own good'.33
For such rhetoric, Refah nevertheless publicly refuted its portrayal by rivals as a party against democracy willing to suppress freedom when in power and that it is a party of 'traditional religious fanatics', which would use its power to 'initiate an Iraniantype regime'.34 Indecd, Refah's integration into Turkey's political arena appears to have been linked its apparently moderate political views. Most notable of which have been its support for a market economy 'albcit tempered by a socially minded statist paternalism'; its encouragement of civil society as reflected through the various professional associations it hclped to crcate; and most importantIy, 'its respect for republican principles and the legal system (notably, its program does not call for introducing the Sharia as the country's constitution)'. 35 Moreover, whilst Islam did indeed provide 'the overaıı theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the RP's platform and agendas', it is worth noting that the Just Order or Refah's 'other ideological expositions' never 'specificaııy' referred to religion. Rather, as one author notes:
The Refah's popular image as an 'Islamic party' was clue more to the history, activities and enunciation of İts main activists -chief among Indeed, as the same author goes on to point out: 'For the Refah's members and its supporters, Islam was not so much a guide for the acquisition and conduct of political power as it was a comforting source of identity and alarger, more general philosophical framework in which to operate'. As such, Refah's electoral success, was less a result of an Islamic upsurge within Turkish society and more as a result of disenchanted voters, 'troubled by Turkey's many. contradictory identities -Turk. European. Middle Eastem, secular. Muslim', and as a consequence, deciding 'to adopt a loosely Islamic identity'.37 In this respect. unlike pre-revolutionary Iran. political Islam in Turkey has been channelled largely through the legitimate electoral participation of a political party not a religious class or institution. As one seni or Refah politician exclaimed: 'even though citizens ask us religious questions. we do not give out Islamic religious opinion, because we are a political, not religious, institution '. 38 In this respect, Refah's appeal cannot realistically be viewed as a consequence of an overwhelming rejection of Turkey's prevailing political system, as was the case of pre-revolutionary Iran. Rather, its elcctoral successes in the i990s can be linked to a number of factors, which in theory are not alien to actors in any functioning multi-party system. Such factors include, but are not limited to: (i) its appeal to minorities (namely the Kurds whom under the 'Islamic' Ottomans felt less alienated than under Atatürk's legacy of Turkish nationalism); (ii) its appeal to those on the lower scale of the social strata (capitalising on Turkey's poor economic achievements which saw inflation rise by 150% in 1995, Refah's attempt to attract Turkey's underprivilcged classes included proposals for an alternatiye order that aims at ensuring integrity. inspired honesty, and induced frugal behaviour 39 ); and (iii) CHP were eroding public confidence not only as a result of corruption and favouritism scandals tamishing the credibility of cenain senior party members, but equally damaging was 'the rotation of the same group of politicians in and out of office, frequently changing pany allegiances or forming their own panies', the conscquence of which was interpreted by the public 'as a game through which politicians pursue vanity and selfaggrandisement rather than the nation's best interests'.40
Guarding National Interest
In assessing the degree to which the rise of political Islam in contemporary Turkey realistically renders its fate comparable to that of post-revolutionary Iran, another imponant aspect that cannot be overlooked is the role of the m ili tary . One of the characteristics of Middle Eastem politics has, and continues to be, the role of the militaryas the ultimate source of protection for authoritarian rulers and their panicular brand of politics. In return for upholding their regime, it is not uncommon for Middle Eastem leaders to channel a disproportionate amount of state resources into developing and co-opting its military even at the expense of the nation's socio-economic development.
As mentioned previously, this was the case in Iran under Reza Shah who constructed the nation's first modern army and later, his son, who continued throughout his rule to diyen enormous state funding into it. As a consequence, with the growing tide of opposition, it was not until Iate December 1978 that Mohammed Reza Shah publicly stated his intention of leaving Iran. The deciding factor was when earlier that same month he bcgan witnessing his army stand aside and do 'nothing to prevent enormous opposition marches and raIlies. [on top of which] soldiers began massiye desenions and mutinies, turning against officers rather than firing on demonstrators'.41 In this respect, Mohammed Reza Shah felt he had lost the army to his opponents and, as such, he had lost his power, thus his decision to leave the country. The role of the military in contemporary Turkey, however, has persisted to be an exception to this role. Put simply, in contrast to most military establishments in the Middle East who tend to support .and protect a particular leader or party in power, an important and rigorously maintained aspect of Atatürk's legacy continue s to be the military's role as the ultimate protector of national interest. As one author explains:
That military leaders have sought to avoid any measures of association with partisan politics fıts well with the institution's image of its own place in Turkish society. Enjoying broad public support, the armed forces have nothing to gain by bccoming involved, except in the most exceptional situations, with the questionablc antics of daily political life. The Cıaim to being the custodians of national legitimacy could not be upheld were they to play an active political role. 42
Reflective the military's independent and pro-secular position in Turkey were Refah's attempts to placate the army through various strategies, including the invitation of Lanumber of prominent and respected retired and active-duty army officers to run as its candidates'.43 Yet, as the same author pointed out, 'secularism appears to be too deeply ingrained in the culture of the Turkish military, especially among its ranking officers, for the Refah to have been able to easily endear itself to the men in uniform'.44 The degree to which such perceptions are upheld by the Turkish military is reflected for example in its response in 1997 to a political rally held in the city of Sincan, in which the Iranian ambassador, as a guest speaker, called for the reimposition in Turkey, of the Sharj'a.
The next moming, not content with diverting 'a column of tanks through the core of that city', the military moved to ensure the arrest of Sincan's Refah mayor and the subsequent expulsion of the Iranian Amba<;sador. 45
In view of the unique and long-standing position of the Turkish military, the rise of a party to power, whether an Islamic inspired one such as Refah or indeed many of the secular ones within the Turkish political' spectre, should at best be viewed as change of govemment not a change of regime. Indeed, the July 1993 incident in the town of Sivas 46 may be an indication that some elements of Refah's constituency is, as one author notes, not necessarily, immune to 'Islamic fascism'.47 Nevertheless, it wou1d be difficult to claim that approval of such extremist actions was widespread or would indeed be tolerated by the majority of people let alone the army. As General Evren, leader of Turkey's 1980 coup pointed out in an interview:
if a danger should threaten to alter completely the Republic and its character, our reaction will be legitimate. In such a case, one abandons the principle of keeping the army out of politics. if a system based on the Shari'a is advanced, even by democratic means, the Turkish armed forees would know not to remain spectators. 48
Certainly, it is not unknown for the Turkish military to intervene in politics as it demonstrated most poignantly in 1960, 1971 and 1980. 49 50lbid., p. 20.
secularism',51 the country's constitutional court ruled on 16 January 1998 for the closure of the party, banning Erbakan from active participation in politics for fıve years. What is interesting however, is the manner in which the Turkish judiciary appears to maintain political perceptions not dissimilar to that of the military. Reflective of this, is that the argument presented in court -and accepted by the judiciary-favouring the closure of Refah was based on the view: 'that the party is uncommitted to the basic tenets of the republic and that it is undemocratic', yet it is noted that Erbakan and his party, did not in fact break 'any particular law, nor were they tried for having done so. Rather it was ruled that Refah as a party had no place in Turkey'.52
S. Concluding remarks
It should be taken into account that the rise of Refah within the Turkish political arena and in particular its victory in the 1995 general elections was not one of a majority win on the legislative level. In fact, had the party been allowed to continue functioning, it is noted that 'secularist forces are too strong for Refah to have won a majority in a new general election'.53 Such secularist forees, it would appear, exist not simply on the elite level, but more importantly on the grassroots level, as reflected not only by the Islamists apparcnt and potential inability to gain majority votes in legislative elections, but also by popular support for state intervention. As one Turkish shop manager argued to a journalisı: 'People are uneducated' and hence 'we need protection against [the tide of political Islam]'.54 In this respect, the apparcnt absence of overt popular concem at Refah's subsequent dosure and, more recently, at the senteneing in March 2000 of its former leader, Erbakan, to a year in prison and the possibility of a life ban from political activity as punishment for a speech made in 1994, where he referred to Turkeys pro-secular parliamentarians as 'gavur' or 'infidels ' In this respect what we seem to be witnessing in contemporary Turkey is a recurring pattem whereby the country's 'constitutional court closes parties, then allows their clones to reopen, just as its military overthrows its leaders, then allows them to return'.57 Nevertheless, while Turkey may not be as democratic as the West, it remains 'decidedly much more democratic than its neighbours to the East'.58 As such, it would be difficult to argue that the participation of an Islamic-onented party in the formal political arena could realistically render the fate of Turkey comparable to that of contemporary Iran whereby a historically independent religious class found itself emerging as 'the product of political struggles under conditions generated by an autocratic and repressive state, which eliminated organised political forces of opposition' and as a consequence gave ' 
